Consumers choosing fixed-rate contracts tend to have insufficient usage to warrant the cost, particularly for new products. We propose and estimate a Bayesian learning model of tariff and usage choice that explains this "flat-rate bias" without relying on behavioral misjudgments or tariff-specific preferences. Consumers face both idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty since utility varies across consumers and the mean is unknown. Aggregate uncertainty inflates prior variances causing consumers to heavily weight private signals. Consumers with high posteriors are therefore overly optimistic. Although posteriors are unbiased across products, this productlevel bias conditional on one's posterior (i.e., "conditional bias") arises for each product, thereby explaining the flat-rate bias. The consequences of conditional bias are exacerbated by switching costs that deter consumers from changing tariffs after updating their beliefs. We demonstrate the effects of uncertainty and switching costs on tariff choices and assess the pricing implications.
Introduction
Firms often price discriminate among consumers with heterogeneous preferences by offering menus of tariff or bundle options. In many cases consumers are uncertain about their future demands and therefore base tariff or subscription choices on their beliefs of future usage. Researchers have begun to explore the accuracy of these beliefs and of optimal contract design given the uncertainty and potential biases. For example, Grubb (2008) shows that three-part tariffs, as used by cellular phone service providers, are nearly optimal when consumers are overconfident (i.e., underestimate the variance of future demand). Miravete (2003) , DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) , and Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) show consumers often choose and retain the wrong tariff for telephone calling plans, health clubs, and internet service, respectively.
In general, the stylized facts indicate a "flat-rate bias" with consumers tending to choose fixedrate contracts when per-use contracts would be better. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) present evidence that biased beliefs about future behavior best explain the flat-rate bias and attribute such biases to irrational or behavioral inclinations. Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) , Lambrecht, Seim, and Skiera (2007) , and Iyengar, Ansari, and Gupta (2007) explain the flat-rate bias by estimating a high mean utility for fixed-rate contracts in models with fixed effects and idiosyncratic preferences for each tariff. Unfortunately, this approach is ill-suited for predicting choices and revenues under alternative tariff schemes since the alternative tariffs' mean utilities are unknown. Moreover, the idiosyncratic preferences for tariffs implies subscriptions necessarily increase as tariffs are added, even if identical to those already offered.
In this paper we propose a Bayesian learning model of tariff and usage choice that can explain the "flat-rate bias" within the rational expectations framework and without invoking tariff-specific preferences. The intuition is simple. Consider a new product for which consumers' "match-values" (i.e., idiosyncratic utilities) are distributed µ i ∼N(µ pop , σ 2 pop ). A narrow interpretation of "rational expectations" is that consumers know this distribution. Taking a broader interpretation more appropriate for new products, suppose consumers know σ 2 pop but not µ pop , which itself is known to be distributed N(µ category , σ 2 category ) across new products within a category. That is, σ 2 pop reflects idiosyncratic uncertainty whereas σ 2 category reflects aggregate uncertainty. The initial common prior is therefore µ i ∼N(µ category , σ 2 pop + σ 2 category ). Private information (i.e., an unbiased signal around µ i ) is incorporated in a Bayesian fashion and consumers choose either the fixed-rate or per-use tariff according to whether their posterior mean is above or below some critical value. Note that consumers may be wrong, on average, about a particular new product without violating rational expectations since they will be correct, on average, across all new products. This setting can obviously explain the flat-rate bias for below-average products with µ pop < µ category since consumers are on average overly optimistic (i.e., have average beliefs that exceed their average µ i ). Perhaps surprisingly, our model can also explain the flat-rate bias for above-average products. Although consumers are, on average, pessimistic when µ pop > µ category , the degree of pessimism declines in the posterior mean because the weight on the private signal is bloated by σ 2 category , as we show in section 3.3. If the beliefs threshold for choosing the fixed-rate is sufficiently high, consumers above the threshold will be optimistic, on average.
We use our model to study the online grocer market in which consumers order groceries for home delivery from a monopolist offering a menu with a fixed-rate tariff, a per-use tariff, and a two-part tariff. This new service is an "experience good" since consumers learn their matchvalues through consumption (Nelson 1970) . Forward-looking consumers therefore have an informational incentive to experiment with the service, leading them to trade off current utility for future utility. Anticipated costs to switching tariffs also lead to dynamic trade-offs. 1 Previous studies of consumers' tariff choices, including DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) , Miravete (1996 Miravete ( ,2002 , Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) , Lambrecht, Seim, and Skiera (2007) , Narayanan, Chintagunta, and Miravete (2007) , and Iyengar, Ansari, and Gupta (2007) , avoid these dynamic trade-offs by assuming switching costs are negligible and uncertainty is resolved independent of consumption. Neither of these assumptions suits our study. Using household-level data we estimate the model and perform counterfactual simulations to evaluate alternative pricing schemes and the effect of uncertainty and switching costs on revenue and consumer surplus.
Our model is rooted in the dynamic brand choice model of Eckstein, Horsky, and Raban (1989) , in which consumers update their beliefs as they experience the brands. Using variants of this model, Erdem and Keene (1996) investigate the role of advertising in consumer learning about laundry detergent, Ackerberg (2003) distinguishes between informative advertising and prestige advertising for a new yogurt, and Crawford and Shum (2005) estimate how rapidly consumers learn the effectiveness and side-effects of anti-ulcer drugs. Predating these applications, Miller (1984) estimates a Bayesian learning model matching workers to jobs.
We extend the dynamic brand choice model to include consumers' initial and subsequent tariff choices. Consumers select tariffs to maximize expected discounted utility given their beliefs, which induces a sorting by beliefs: Consumers who expect to purchase often choose tariffs with high flat fees and low per-use prices. The observed high usage of such consumers therefore reflects both the self-selection and the low per-use price. By endogenizing consumers' tariff choices, our model disentangles these two drivers of observed usage.
Using our estimated model we assess the effectiveness of tariff menus as screening mechanisms to price discriminate among heterogeneous consumers who face uncertainty. We numerically solve for optimal tariffs and menus of tariffs, assuming they are fixed over time (as in our data), and find that tariff menus are ineffective screening devices for price discrimination. Adding a second two-part tariff increases discounted profits marginally and a third tariff adds no gain. Miravete (2002 Miravete ( ,2004 ) also finds limited gains from complex tariffs when consumers learn about their demand over time, as do Courty and Hao (2000) when ex-ante consumer heterogeneity is high. The gains are minimal because the incentive compatability constraints are costly for the firm to satisfy: offering additional tariffs reduces the firm's ability to extract surplus from high demand consumers.
Moreover, fixed fees play two roles when consumers face high costs to switching tariffs. In addition to extracting surplus from inframarginal units consumed, they may lock consumers into paying the fixed fee even when they learn their match-value is lower than initially expected. Including a per-use option on the menu may therefore lower revenues since fewer consumers will choose the tariffs with fixed fees. Indeed, eliminating the per-use option from the current menu increases predicted revenues by over 20 percent.
Data
We use consumer-level data on grocery deliveries to 5368 households in a single metropolitan market during the 70 weeks from September 16, 1997 to January 23, 1999. The earlier date is the online grocer's commencement of service. The online grocer was a monopolist in the homedelivery business who partnered with an existing local grocery chain to supply groceries. Online prices and discounts were the same as in the chain's stores. Consumers learned about the service through advertising in the form of mass mailings, media stories, print and radio advertising, instore advertising by the partner chain, and displays on the delivery trucks. Most consumers enrolled while shopping in the partner-chain's stores. No free trials were offered. Once enrolled, consumers placed orders from their computers using installed software or a web-based interface. Consumers selected a two-hour delivery window, typically the next day, during which someone would be home to accept the delivery.
The online grocer offered consumers a menu of three two-part tariffs with weekly fixed-fees of F = ($5.76, $1.14, 0) and per-delivery prices of p = (0, $5, $11.95), respectively. Plan 1 is therefore a fixed-rate plan and plan 3 is a uniform pricing plan. F and p are sometimes called ex-ante and ex-post prices, respectively, since consumers pay F prior to knowing their usage and pay p only for units consumed. Although the online grocer quotes fees on a monthly basis, consumers could change plans at any time, with fees pro-rated.
We observe each consumer's enrollment date and initial tariff choice, the date of each of her orders, her subscription plan at the time of each order, and the amount of each grocery order, which averages $119. We treat the enrollment date as exogenous, reflecting the randomness in which consumers become aware of the service. To ensure sufficient opportunity to observe usage behavior, we only use consumers who enroll by week 60.
Since grocery shopping typically occurs weekly, we model weekly usage of the online grocer, with c it = 1 if consumer i orders at least once during week t and c it = 0 for no orders. t = 1 is the week of enrollment, not the first week of our sample. Only 2.8 percent of customers' weeks with orders have more than one order.
s it ∈ 1, 2, 3 denotes consumer i's subscription plan in week t. Unfortunately, we only observe a consumer's plan upon enrollment and with each order. Surprisingly, we never observe consumers switch (i.e., no one switches and orders again). 2 Hence, we assume s it is unchanged between orders.
The plan beyond the last order, however, is censored. Although we do not observe switches, many consumers likely "quit" by switching to plan 3, which has no fee, and never ordering again. To account for this event, our likelihood function (equation 9) integrates over all plans to compute the probability of observing no usage during the "trailing weeks" between a customer's last order and the end of our sample period.
In Table 1 , we provide relevant summary statistics for each plan. Only 12.3 percent of consumers signed up for plan 1, compared to 31.9 percent for plan 2 and 55.8 percent for plan 3.
The mean weekly usage rate was .61 for plan 1 enrollees, .38 for plan 2 enrollees, and .21 for plan 3 enrollees. We compute each consumer's usage rate from the weeks spanning enrollment and the last observed order. This measure is an upper bound since it ignores weeks beyond the last order during which the consumer may have remained on the plan but did not order. In Table 1 , we also report the range of usage rates for which each plan minimizes the expected cost per order.
Figure 1 plots this expected cost, which equals p + F usage probability , for each plan as a function of expected usage. Plan 1 minimizes costs for usage rates above .67, plan 3 minimizes costs for usage rates below .23, and plan 2 minimizes costs elsewhere. As the last row of Table 1 indicates, more than half the consumers who enrolled in plans with fees minimized ex-post delivery costs, assuming they quit after the last observed order. The flip-side is that nearly half did not minimize costs, which suggests consumers indeed faced substantial uncertainty and switching costs. If consumers were uncertain but faced no switching costs, they would switch plans if their beliefs crossed the expected-usage thresholds depicted in Figure 1 . The absence in our data of switches followed by usage therefore suggests switching costs are high.
Some consumers enroll in plans with fixed fees but never try the service: 12 percent of those on plan 1 and 17 percent of those on plan 2 never order. Since we only use consumers who enroll at least 10 weeks before the end of our sample period, such outcomes suggest consumers can receive information and revise beliefs without actually placing an order. A "post-enrollment" signal can reflect difficulty installing the software or navigating the company's website for ordering, thereby leading the consumer to quit without ever ordering. The details of this specification and the initial tariff choice appear in sections 3.3 and 3.4.
The empirical content of our data is best summarized by plotting usage rates over time for enrollees of each plan. In Figure 2 , the top solid line is the average c it across all consumers who signed up for plan 1, even if they may have quit (i.e., including weeks beyond their last order). Nearly 74 percent of plan 1 enrollees used the online grocer during their first week. Their usage declined to around .20 by 60 weeks after enrollment. Average c it becomes noisy as "weeks 2 Consumers even ignored letters explaining they should switch plans. The firm also assures us new customer IDs would not have been assigned upon switching. Being skeptical, we searched our data for matches within zip codes between new customers and customers who recently placed their last order. Candidates are regular customers on plans 2 or 3 whose last order is shortly before a new customer enrolls on plan 1 and orders regularly. Only four possible matches were found, which had a negligible effect on the estimates.
since enrollment" increases, since few consumers signed up early enough to provide such data. If switching costs were low, this usage drop could be explained by plan 1 enrollees with low initial beliefs quickly dropping after experientially confirming their beliefs. That is, consumers with low initial beliefs can justifiably sign up for plan 1 if switching costs are low since the incentive to experiment implies initial usage is higher than the expected long-run usage. A high probability of needing to switch does not deter consumers from signing up for high-fee tariffs when switching costs are low. However, high switching costs, as suggested by the lack of observed switches, imply plan 1 enrollees should have had initial beliefs high enough to warrant this plan in the long run.
The quick drop in usage of plan 1 enrollees therefore implies they were overly optimistic. In section 3.3, we propose a specification of beliefs that nests two alternative explanations for this pattern: aggregate biases and conditional biases. Aggregate biases shift all consumers beliefs equally whereas conditional biases depend on the signals consumers receive. In section 5 we show that conditional bias is more important than aggregate bias for explaining our data.
The decline in usage for consumers on plan 3 in Figure 2 provides evidence of consumptionbased learning by forward-looking consumers. The optimistic-beliefs explanation for the steep decline in plan 1 consumers' usage is less plausible for plan 3 consumers. Plan 3 has no flat fee and therefore appeals to consumers who have low expectations for their match-value. Hence the (relatively) high usage rates during the first few weeks of enrollment reflects the incentive to acquire information about match-values.
The dotted lines in Figure 2 are usage rates conditional on consuming some time beyond the week for which the usage rate is being computed. Since this conditioning event selects from consumers who are learning their match-values are (relatively) high, the rates are higher than the unconditional usage rates and increase at the end of the sample period.
Model
In section 3.1 we propose a Bayesian learning model of consumers' tariff choices and usage of an experience good. We then present comparative statics to illustrate the effects of price sensitivity, switching costs, and uncertainty on tariff choice and usage conditional on tariff choice. In section 3.3 we specify the distribution of match-values and initial beliefs and distinguish between aggregate and conditional biases. Finally, in section 3.4 we explicitly model the initial tariff choice.
A Bayesian Learning Model
We model the consumer's weekly decision of whether to use the online grocer. The consumer's decision has two dynamic aspects. First, the online grocer's service is a new experience good about which consumers initially have limited information. As the consumer uses the service, she learns her utility from it. In particular, a consumer may learn whether she can efficiently use the ordering software, whether she likes the produce selected, and whether she indeed saves much time by using the online grocer. If the consumer's prior belief suggests the service is unlikely to be good for her, she may still try it since the lower expected current utility from the online grocer may be offset by the possibility of learning it is, in fact, good.
The second dynamic aspect arises from the firm's use of subscription plans combined with the presence of switching costs. The firm offers a fixed menu of M two-part tariffs denoted by (F 1 , p 1 , . . . , F M , p M ), where F denotes the vector of flat fees and p denotes the vector of per-use prices. Each consumer chooses the best subscription plan (i.e., tariff) given her beliefs about the value of the service to her and the costs of switching plans in the event that a switch is warranted.
For many products switching costs are explicit financial charges. Since the online grocer does not charge consumers to change plans, this cost represents the hassle of thinking about which plan is best and calling to request the change.
Each week, consumers choose subscription plans and usage to maximize expected discount utility from grocery shopping, net of switching costs, conditional on available information I it :
where c t ∈ {0, 1} is the consumer's usage choice in period t (c t = 1 for the online grocer), s t ∈ {0, . . . , M } is the subscription (i.e., tariff) choice, u it is a vector of i.i.d. shocks to utility from each of the usage choices, β is the weekly discount factor, α is the constant marginal utility of money, δ is the switching cost, and I is an indicator function. Importantly, u it is known by the consumer prior to the choice of c it but is unknown prior to the choice of s it .
The utility consumer i obtains from using only the traditional grocery store in period t is simply the idiosyncratic shock: U i0t = u i0t . The utility from using the online grocer is
where u i1t is the idiosyncratic shock, p s it is the per-use component of tariff s it , and µ i + it is the experience signal which is noisy due to variation in the provision of the service (e.g., the quality of the fresh produce or the time it took for the delivery to arrive). 3 The consumer uses the noisy signal to learn about her match-value µ i .
Following Eckstein, Horsky, and Raban (1988) , we specify a Bayesian learning process that exploits conjugate distributions, as described in DeGroot (1970) . In particular,
with a prior µ i ∼ N (m it , σ 2 it ) yields a learning process in which the posterior on µ i after an experience signal µ i + it is µ i ∼ N (m i,t+1 , σ 2 i,t+1 ), where
This model of Bayesian learning is tractable because all the consumer's information regarding µ i is captured by the posterior mean m it and posterior variance σ it , both of which have closed-form expressions. Since the posterior is normal, the subsequent update follows the same process, with this posterior serving as the prior. Information at t is therefore I it = (m it , σ it ).
Consumers choose their subscription plans prior to observing the idiosyncratic shocks u. 4
Without loss of generality, we model the sequence of decisions within a period to first entail the usage choice for the current period, followed by the plan choice for the following period. Hence, s it is a state variable chosen at the end of period t−1. 
fixed Expected discounted utility as a function of the current state, assuming optimal policies are implemented each period, is given by Bellman's equation
The expectation is over next period's state and the current period experience signal µ i + it . Following Rust (1987) , we integrate over the i.i.d. u shocks to remove them from the state space as they only affect current utility. Assuming u are type I extreme value, this integration has an analytic solution. The stochastic evolution of beliefs is the remaining unknown determinant of the continuation value. Accordingly, let µ it = µ i + it denote the realized experience signal (when c it = 1).
In the following integrated value function, the first exponent corresponds to c it = 0 and the second exponent corresponds to c it = 1:
where γ is Euler's constant and m i,t+1 (·) and σ i,t+1 (·) govern the updating of the posterior mean and variance using (3). The perceived distribution of experience signals Φ is normal with mean m it and variance σ 2 it + σ 2 to account for both the noise in the signal and the uncertainty of current beliefs.
When c it = 0, the beliefs µ it and σ it do not change since no signal is received. When c it = 1 the maximization that determines s i,t+1 occurs inside the integration over the experience signal since consumers make this choice after observing the signal. Our model of tariff choice differs from Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) , Lambrecht, Seim, and Skiera (2007) , and Iyengar, Ansari, and Gupta (2007) in that consumers do not have idiosyncratic preferences for tariffs. The optimal tariff in our model maximizes the consumer's expected discounted utility from usage choices. Tariffs themselves do not provide utility in our model: they only affect the cost of usage, and have no differential transactions costs.
We solve this dynamic model numerically using Gauss-Hermite quadrature (Judd 1998 ) to integrate over µ it . We discretize m it and use linear interpolation to evaluate V at points off the grid.
The posterior variance is a deterministic function of the number of experience signals processed, which we allow to vary from zero to 99.
Implications and comparative statics
We present comparative statics to illustrate the effect of price sensitivity, switching costs, and uncertainty on tariff choice and usage across the three plans, when consumers face the tariff menu observed in our data.
In Figure 3 , we present consumers' optimal tariffs and usage rates after match-value uncertainty has been fully resolved as functions of the match-value (on the x-axis) and the consumer's current plan (distinguished by plotting symbols). The price coefficient, α, is .1 for plots in the left column and .3 for the right column. Switching costs in dollar terms, δ/α, are zero for the top row, $50 for the middle row, and $300 for the bottom row.
In the top row, we do not distinguish across current plans since plan choice is independent of the current plan with no switching costs. Consumers with low match-values choose the "No Fee" plan, consumers with high match-values choose the "High Fee" plan and moderate matchvalue consumers choose the "Low Fee" plan. With known match-values, usage frequencies of each plan's enrollees necessarily fall within the ranges, depicted in Figure 1 , for which the chosen plan minimizes expected delivery costs, p+ F usage probability . increases monotonically with match-value, with discrete jumps at the thresholds separating "No Fee" subscribers from "Low Fee" subscribers and "Low Fee" subscribers from "High Fee" subscribers. The usage jumps at the thresholds are increasing in α since higher α implies a greater sensitivity to the different marginal prices of each plan. The thresholds also shift to the right as α increases since higher match-values are needed to justify using the service. Moreover, the threshold separating the no-fee plan from the low-fee plan shifts more than the threshold separating the low-fee plan from the high-fee plan since the expected cost per use is lower for consumers with higher match-values. Consequently, the range of match-values choosing the low-fee plan shrinks as α increases. In fact, no consumers choose the low-fee plan when α exceeds .3414.
The effect of switching costs on tariff choice, given a previous plan, is demonstrated in the lower two rows of plots. With moderate switching costs of $50 and low price sensitivity, "High Fee" subscribers will switch to either the "Low Fee" or "No Fee" plan if their realized match-value falls sufficiently from the relatively high prior value that induced the consumer to initially choose the "High Fee" plan. Moderate switching costs with high price sensitivity, however, lead the "High Fee" subscriber to either stay on her current plan or to switch to the "No Fee" plan. The higher α reduces usage on the low fee plan enough that switching to it is never worth $50.
In the bottom row of Figure 3 , we show that with high switching costs, consumers never switch to or from the "Low Fee" plan and only switch across the "No Fee" and "High Fee" plans in extreme cases. Consequently, consumers with similar match-values face different marginal prices if their initial beliefs varied sufficiently that they first chose different plans.
Whereas Figure 3 focuses on tariff choice and usage given a current subscription plan and no remaining uncertainty, Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the determinants of the initial tariff choice, at which time consumers' match-values are unknown. In Figure 4 , we plot the thresholds that divide match-value beliefs on the y-axis, according to the corresponding optimal initial plan, as functions of price sensitivity on the x-axis. We depict three scenarios: no uncertainty and uncertainty with and without switching costs. The no-uncertainty case, the solid line, is the same scenario as the top row of Figure 3 . As such, the threshold line dividing "No Fee" from "Low Fee" converges to the line dividing "Low Fee" from "High Fee" as price sensitivity increases: no consumers choose "Low Fee" for α > .3414. As α increases, the market share of "No Fee" monotonically increases.
When consumers are uncertain and face high switching costs (the dotted line), the set of beliefs for which the "Low Fee" plan is optimal expands. The increased attraction of the middle plan is that it enables consumers to at least be near the plan that will be optimal after the uncertainty has been resolved, without having to incur the switching costs. When consumers face uncertainty but no switching costs (the dashed line), the threshold lines shift down since consumers know they will increase their usage, relative to the no uncertainty case, to gain information about their matchvalue. Higher usage with no cost of being stuck on the wrong plan implies consumers will shift to the higher-fee plans.
Figures 3 and 4 show α influences both the initial plan shares and the gaps in usage rates across plans. Hence, these moments help to identify α when we estimate the model.
The effect of switching costs on initial plan shares and usage conditional on plan (i.e., the allocation of match-values across plans) implies δ is identified by more than just switching behavior. Figure 5 , we put switching costs on the x-axis to provide more details of this effect, with α of .1 in the top plot and .3 in the bottom plot. In both plots, each plan has some subscribers for low switching costs, although in the bottom plot the range of beliefs for which "Low Fee" is optimal is small and requires very low switching costs. As switching costs increase to moderate levels, the "Low Fee" plan loses its appeal but then becomes attractive again as switching costs increase further. In both plots, switching costs near $400 are sufficiently high that consumers know they will never switch. Note that switching to "No Fee" will never occur if δ/α exceeds F/(1 − β), the present discounted value of paying F each period.
Initial beliefs: aggregate and conditional biases
Along with the parameters of the model in section 3.1, we estimate the distribution of match-values across consumers and consumers' initial beliefs. 5 For parsimony and to facilitate our discussion of rational expectations, we assume match-values are distributed N (µ pop , σ 2 pop ), though any distribution may be used. Beliefs are distributed normal, with a common initial prior µ i ∼ N (μ pop ,σ 2 pop ), whereμ pop andσ 2 pop denote consumers' beliefs about the population mean and variance of matchvalues.
Consumers typically have private information before enrolling, such as their proximity to grocers and computer savviness. We model such information as unbiased private signals (µ i + i,pre ) ∼ N (µ i , σ 2 pre ), where the subscript pre indicates pre-enrollment. Consumers then update beliefs to µ i ∼ N (m i0 , σ 2 i0 ), where
In empirical learning models "rational expectations" means consumers know the distribution of match-values. In most applications, such as Miller (1984) and Crawford and Shum (2005) , this notion is applied at the product level, which would implyμ pop = µ pop andσ 2 pop = σ 2 pop . For new products this interpretation is too narrow: consumers may over-estimate the value of a particular new product while still being correct on average across many new products.
As in Ackerberg (2005), we take a broader view of rational expectations and consider the population mean itself to be distributed normal: µ pop ∼ N (µ category , σ 2 category ) for some category of products. Rational expectations over the category impliesμ pop = µ category andσ 2 pop = σ 2 pop + σ 2 category for each product since the perceived uncertaintyσ pop accounts for both the dispersion in match-values for the focus product and the uncertainty in its mean match-value.
The posterior mean m i0 is unbiased with the usual conditioning on the consumer's information set: m i0 = E(µ i |I i0 ), where I i0 consists of the initial prior and the realized signal. But firms and researchers are usually interested in whether consumers' beliefs are correct regarding a particular product. We therefore define "product-level bias" by also conditioning on µ pop :
where z(m i0 ) is the signal value that leads to m i0 . The term
is the posterior mean if µ pop were known (i.e., (μ pop ,σ 2 pop ) = (µ pop , σ 2 pop )) which therefore equals E(µ i |I i0 , µ pop ).
Importantly, product-level biases do not imply irrational or sub-optimal behavior. Rational expectations requires that beliefs be unbiased given consumers' information sets, but product-level bias conditions on the unknown µ pop . Nonetheless, we follow the convention of using "bias" to describe product-level discrepencies between expectations and realizations.
We decompose product-level bias into two components: "aggregate bias" due toμ pop = µ pop shifting m i0 equally for all consumers and "conditional bias" due toσ 2 pop = σ 2 pop shifting m i0 by an amount that depends on each consumer's signal. For new productsσ 2 pop > σ 2 pop which increases the signal's weight causing consumers with high signals for a given product to be overly optimistic, on average, for that product. 6 We illustrate product-level bias and its implications for tariff choice in Figure 6 . For this example we use µ category = 0, σ 2 category = 3, σ 2 pop = 1, σ 2 pre = 1, and consider three products with µ pop realizations of −2, 0, and 2. If consumers knew these µ pop realizations their priors would be N(-2,1), N(0,1), and N(2,1), respectively, and their posteriors would be unbiased at the product level. Since the µ pop are unknown, the prior for each product is N(0,1+3) and the posteriors exhibit product-level biases as plotted in the top graph.
The quality shock µ pop affects all consumers equally, shifting bias(m i0 ; µ pop ) up and down.
We refer to this shift as "aggregate bias." The posterior's aggregate bias is less than the difference betweenμ pop and µ pop because the informative signal partially corrects beliefs.
The degree of uncertainty about µ pop (i.e., σ 2 category ) determines the slope of product-level bias. As σ 2 category increases, consumers place more weight on their private signals. The higher weight, however, is due to the increased value of the signal for implicitly learning about µ pop , not one's location within the distribution of match-values for the focus product. Hence, the higher weight increases the relationship between product-level bias and m io . We refer to this variation in bias across beliefs as "conditional bias" since the bias is conditional on one's signal.
To clarify conditional bias consider the special case of no aggregate bias (i.e.,μ pop = µ pop ).
Despite having unbiased priors and unbiased signals, consumers' posteriors exhibit product-level bias: those who receive signals above µ pop will, on average, be overly optimistic and those with signals below µ pop will be overly pessimistic, as illustrated by the middle line in the top graph of Figure 6 . Hence, posteriors can be biased even when both the prior and the signal are unbiased.
Conditional bias is particularly relevant for models of tariff choice since consumers use threshold rules to choose their tariff: consumers with beliefs above some threshold m * choose the fixedrate plan, whereas consumers with m i0 < m * choose plans with lower fixed fees and higher per-use charges. Consumers on the fixed-rate plan will therefore have higher bias than consumers on other plans. As such, if the product is weakly better than average (i.e., µ pop ≥ µ category ), consumers on the fixed-rate plan will necessarily have positive bias. Moreover, if the product is worse than 6 Expressions for each of these components can be obtained from equation 7 by noting that mi0 in equation 6 may be written as mi0 = 1 − average (i.e., has a negative aggregate bias due to µ pop < µ category ), consumers on the fixed-rate plan will, on average, have a positive bias if the threshold m * is sufficiently high.
We illustrate this result in the middle graph of Figure 6 , which reports for each product the average product-level bias for consumers with m i0 exceeding hypothetical m * thresholds. At the lowest cutoff few consumers are excluded, so the lowest reported bias is approximately the average across the population (i.e., the aggregate bias). The average product-level bias across all consumers is zero for the product with no aggregate bias, as expected, and is around .5 and −.5 for products with quality shocks of −2 and 2, respectively. The average bias conditional on m i0 > m * obviously increases in m * and becomes positive at m * = 1.9 for the pessimistic example with µ i distributed N(0,2).
Finally, the bottom plot of Figure 6 presents the share of consumers who are optimistic, conditional on their posterior mean exceeding the hypothetical m * . Again, the lowest cutoff values exclude few consumers so the lowest shares are approximately population measures. With µ pop = 0 exactly half of the consumers are optimistic, with the negative quality shock more than half are optimistic, and with the positive quality shock less than half are optimistic. Because of conditional bias, the share of consumers who are optimistic increases in the threshold m * . Even for products withμ pop < µ pop , a threshold exists above which consumers tend to be overly optimistic. As such, conditional bias provides an explanation for the "fixed-rate bias" even when consumers are on average pessimistic about a new product.
Thus far, we have presented a rational expectations framework in which conditional bias provides a basis for the oft-cited intuition that people with high beliefs tend to be overly optimistic and often erroneously choose fixed-rate tariffs. We acknowledge, however, that conditional biases can also arise from behavioral conjectures that violate strict rationality. The high weight on private signals that causes conditional bias may, for example, reflect projection bias. 7 In most data, including ours, the behavioral and fully rational scenarios are observationally equivalent. Our estimator is unaffected by the source of product-level bias. We therefore separately estimate consumers' initial beliefs (μ pop ,σ pop ) and the distribution of match-values (µ pop , σ pop ) and remain agnostic about whether their differences reflect behavioral misjudgments or the rational expectations structure with uncertainty about µ pop .
The special case ofσ 2 pop = ∞ is of particular interest. With flat priors the posterior after processing one signal is centered around the private signal: µ i ∼ N (µ i + i,pre ,σ 2 pre ). This specification maximizes conditional bias and eliminates aggregate bias sinceμ pop receives no weight in the posterior (and is therefore not identified). Narayanan, Chintagunta, and Miravete (2007) use this specification to study tariff choice for local telephone service. For models with severe conditional bias, this specification is appealing with two fewer parameters and a similar ability to fit the data, but it is nonetheless a restriction one ought to test.
Consumers' initial tariff choices
Given pre-enrollment beliefs m i0 , the consumer chooses the initial tariff s i0 that maximizes expected discounted utility. After enrolling consumers obtain an unbiased signal of µ i based, for example, on their experience installing the software or perusing the items available to purchase. To account for this anticipated post-enrollment signal, we integrate over the signal value µ i0 = µ i + i,post and consider the option of switching tariffs (i.e., s i1 = s i0 ) given the realized signal. The optimal initial tariff therefore solves max
where
is the posterior mean and
is the posterior variance.
The perceived distribution of signals Φ is normal with mean m i0 and variance σ 2 post + σ 2 i0 to account for both the noise in the signal and the uncertainty of current beliefs. 
Estimation
We now address issues related to estimating the model. In section 4.1 we discuss identification.
We derive the likelihood function and discuss our simulation estimator in section 4.2. We augment the model in section 4.3 to account for exogenous quits. Finally, in section 4.4 we consider random coefficients.
Identification
The match-value distribution parameters µ pop and σ 2 pop are identified by consumers' usage rates at the end of their histories-after experience signals have eliminated much of the uncertainty. The extent to which initial beliefs are biased, and whether the bias is an aggregate bias (i.e.,μ = µ) or a conditional bias (i.e.,σ 2 pop = σ 2 pop ), depends on the degree to which average usage rates adjust over time and how the adjustments vary across plans. The marked drop in usage of consumers on plan 1 (with the high fee), relative to the change in usage of consumers on the other plans, suggests a significant conditional bias. The variance of the pre-enrollment signal σ 2 pre is identified by the degree of ex-ante beliefs heterogeneity needed to fit variation in consumers' initial tariff choices and initial usage rates. The variance of the post-enrollment signal σ 2 post is identified by the degree to which consumers initial usage rates appear inconsistent with their tariff choice. For example, a (relatively) high σ 2 post enables the model to predict that some consumers who enroll on the high fixed-fee plan will never use the service. The speed with which behavior adjusts over time identifies σ , the informativeness of the experience signals.
With no observed plan switches, one might expect infinite switching costs. High switching costs, however, reduce the model's ability to explain nonusage between a consumer's last order and the end of our sample. Long trailing periods of nonusage are possibly due to consumer's quitting (i.e., switching to plan 3) and never ordering again. Such events only receive significant weight in the integration over the unobserved plan during trailing weeks if switching costs are not too high.
As we demonstrate in section 3.2, switching costs also influence consumers' initial tariff choices and are therefore partly identified by these choices.
The price coefficient is identified by gaps in usage rates across consumers on different plans, as depicted in Figure 3 and discussed in section 3.2. The discount factor β is identified by the degree to which early usage exceeds later usage, even for plan 3 enrollees, since the information value of early uses increases in β. As discussed by Rust (1994) , however, β would not be identified without our parametric assumptions on utility.
Since the model is nonlinear and involves many unobserved components, we verify the model is identified by simulating 50 data sets and obtaining 50 point estimates. The mean estimate of each parameter is sufficiently close to its true value.
The likelihood function
Since consumers' match-values and beliefs are not observed, we integrate over µ i , i,pre , i,post , and it . Let θ denote the vector of parameters to estimate, which will be a subset of (µ pop ,μ pop , σ pop ,σ pop , σ pre , σ post , σ , β, α, δ), depending on the particular specification.
For each draw of unobservables over a consumer's entire history, we compute the likelihood of the observed sequence of c it and s it over the T i weeks between the consumer's enrollment and the end of the sample. Since s it is unobserved in weeks after the last usage, the likelihood for these trailing weeks is based only on the observed c it = 0. Let τ i − 1 be the i th consumer's last week with c it = 1 (so τ i is the first week with censored s). Integrating over the unobserved match-value and signals, the likelihood for consumer i is then
where m it ( i , µ i ) makes explicit the dependence of beliefs on the unobserved match-value µ i and
t=1 ), The first line of this likelihood entails the probability of the weeks from enrollment to the last usage, whereas the second line entails the likelihood for the trailing weeks after the last usage. The summation in the second line integrates over the censored tariff choice s iτ after the last usage. Since s it only changes after signals are received, s it = s iτ for t ≥ τ .
As shown in Miller (1984) and Rust (1987) , P r(c it |m it , σ it , s it ; θ) has the familiar logit formula. Net of the idiosyncratic utility shock u it , the value of choosing c it = 0 is
and the value of choosing c it = 1 is
We use the standard normalizations to fix the scale and level of utility and obtain
The plan choice s it is deterministic given beliefs m it and σ it . That is, P r(s it |m it , σ it , s i,t−1 ; θ) equals one if s it is optimal given (m it , σ it , s i,t−1 ) and equals zero otherwise. Mathematically,
where s(m it , σ it , s i,t−1 ; θ) ≡ argmax s {V (m it , σ it , s) − αF s − δI(s = s it )} denotes the optimal tariff that solves the maximization embedded in the continuation value integrands of both equations 8 and 5. Though this choice is deterministic given beliefs, from the econometrician's perspective, s it is probabilistic since beliefs are unobserved. Now consider the integration over the censored plan choice for the trailing weeks t ≥ τ i .
Beliefs are fixed after the last usage since no more signals are received. Hence, the censored plan is s(m iτ i , σ iτ i , s iτ i −1 ; θ). Integration over the censored plan is therefore automatically handled by the integration over unobserved beliefs.
We use monte carlo simulation with 2000 draws to evaluate L i (θ) for each consumer and obtain our estimator by maximizing the product of the consumers' simulated likelihoods, using the nested fixed-point algorithm of Rust (1987) . Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994) show that simulated maximum likelihood yields an inconsistent estimator for a fixed number of draws. To increase the efficiency of our simulation estimator, we draw experience signals from the distribution for which the observed plan choice is indeed optimal, and reweight the likelihood by the probability mass of this truncated normal. The sampling scheme is a non-standard application of the GewekeHajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) importance sampler. 8
8 Due to switching costs, the set of experience signals for which a given plan is optimal may contain two noncontiguous regions. In the absence of this sampling scheme, the contribution to the likelihood of many of the draws of (µi, i) would be zero due to a zero probability of the tariff choice in equation 13, which is deterministic given beliefs. Sampling from truncated normals and reweighting also yields a smooth simulated likelihood function since the weights are smooth functions of the parameters, which aids in the numerical optimization and computing of standard errors.
Exogenous quits
Many households use the online grocer regularly over a long period and suddenly stop. Although such behavior can indicate slow learning, it may also reflect permanent household shocks, such as moving, marriage, divorce, childbirth, retirement, and so forth. To account for such shocks, we assume each household exogenously quits in each period with probability γ. We assume consumers are unaware of these possible shocks. To account for exogenous quits in the likelihood, multiply each P r(c it |m it ( i , µ i ), σ it , s it ; θ) by 1 − γ in the first line of equation 9, and replace
in the second line with
Each trailing week's inactivity may be due to either an exogenous quit in the current period or a prior period, or due to choosing the traditional store despite still being a subscriber. 9 We fix γ = 0.003 based on the frequency of household relocations in our market, which implies a .145
annualized exogenous quit rate. 10
Parameter heterogeneity
We use the importance sampling methodology of Ackerberg (2009) 9 Once the consumer exogenously quits, however, the subsequent periods of inactivity no longer represent observations. For example, if Ti = 52 and τi = 51, the probability of these trailing weeks is the sum of the probability she exogenously quits at t = 51, the probability she chooses no usage at t = 51 and exogenously quits at t = 52, and the probability she chooses no usage at both t = 51 and t = 52. Equation 14 sums the probabilities of these different explanations for the trailing weeks of non-usage. 10 We experimented with estimating γ, but its estimate of .019 (which implies an annualized rate of .63) seems implausibly high. The higher γ increases the switching costs estimate since (censored) endogenous quits are less important for explaining the trailing weeks of non-usage when γ is high. If the data contained observed switches we would be more inclined to estimate γ. 11 Varying θ across consumers requires finding the fixed point V for each consumer type each time we evaluate the likelihood. For example, using three binary demographic variables increases computation time for the likelihood by a factor of eight. Given the number of consumer characteristics at our disposal, interacting them with model parameters is not computationally feasible. Furthermore, we only observe these characteristics for the subset of consumers who volunteered such information.
To be more precise, let g(θ|ρ) be the probability density function of random coefficients parameterized by ρ and let h(θ) be an arbitrary distribution (independent of ρ). Then,
We draw (θ 1 i , . . . , θ N S i ) from h and compute the simulated likelihood
We center the initial h around estimates without random coefficients and use a high variance so that the reweighting (with h in the denominator) does not explode. We then iterate by setting h to the previous iteration's g until the estimated ρ implies g is similar to h. We impose restrictions like σ pop > 0 by using truncated normals for g and h. 12 Although we do not observe in the actual data when consumers quit by switching (see section 2), we do know when such quits occur in simulated data. Hence, in addition to usage rates and initial plan shares, for each model we report the share of consumers on each plan who switch (and order again) and the share who quit (i.e., switch to plan 3 and never order again).
Results
The full model, in Figure 7 .b, indeed replicates the data. The model accurately predicts usage by enrollees in each plan and in each week, except week 1. The very steep declines in usage from week 1 to week 2 by consumers on plans 2 and 3, relative to the subsequent declines in the data, suggest week 1 usage may be driven by an element not present in our model. In particular, consumers could sign up online as part of placing their first order. To avoid possible specification error of the week 1 usage, we ignore these usage choices (i.e., P r(c it |m it ( i , µ i ), σ it , s it ; θ) = 1 for t = 1 in equation 9).
12 For each consumer, we use 50 draws of the parameters that affect the consumer's dynamic program (i.e., σpop, σpre, σpost, σ , β, α, δ). For each vector of these dynamic parameters, we solve the dynamic program and evaluate the likelihood for 100 draws of µpop andμpop. This approach is more efficient since µpop andμpop do not enter the fixed point computation.
For the models with conditional bias, one might expect usage of consumers on plan 3 to increase as they correct their pessimistic beliefs. For the full model, 98 percent of these consumers have m i0 < µ i and the average bias is −8.73. Yet their predicted usage declines over time. The reason is that although the post-enrollment signal raises their beliefs, by an average of 8 such that only 58 percent are pessimistic, the consumers with high posteriors after this signal actually have positive biases. Since these consumers are the most likely to use the service, average beliefs and usage decline among consumers on plan 3. In short, optimistic consumers tend to use the service and revise their beliefs down, whereas pessimistic consumers tend to never use the service, and therefore never adjust their beliefs. Hence, the average belief (and usage) can decline even when consumers are on average pessimistic.
The full model also fits consumers' plan choices, despite the absence of plan-specific utility terms. Predicted plan shares are .129, .317, and .554, respectively, compared to actual shares of 0.123, 0.319, and 0.558. Moreover, the model predicts that only one-fourth of one percent of consumers switch and order again, while over half of plan 1 enrollees choose to quit. Exogenous quitting due to γ = .003 adds to these quits, and is the only mechanism for simulated plan 2 enrollees to quit since estimated switching costs are prohibitively high.
The model with only conditional biases is the second best fitting model (of the first five)
in terms of log-likelihood and usage patterns, but it overpredicts the plan 3 share by the largest margin across all models. The model with only aggregate biases does not deliver enough of a decline in usage and predicts that nearly a quarter of plan 3 enrollees and 2.2 percent of plan 1 enrollees will switch plans and order again. Conditional biases are clearly more important than aggregate biases for explaining our data.
The predicted usage rates of the myopic model, in Figure 7 .e, decline much faster than in the real data and the simulated consumers never quit or switch plans. Both of these aspects of the myopic model are unappealing. In Figure 7 .f we see that the model without any product-level biases fits the data poorly. With neither aggregate nor conditional biases, the decline in usage over time is due only to exogenous quits and the resolution of uncertainty (which reduces the information-acquisition incentive to purchase).
Having established that the full model fits the data well, we now turn to interpreting its parameter estimates. Consumers had imprecise information about the value of this service for the overall population, as implied byσ pop /α = 17.549/.358 = 49. Indeed,σ pop is nearly eight times the degree of heterogeneity in actual match-values (σ pop = 2.2). For a new service using new technology, we expect uncertainty to be high. Given σ pre = 23.565, the weight on the pre-enrollment signal is .357 and the weight onμ pop = −6.473 is .643. Sinceμ pop is lower than µ pop (-1.687), the aggregate bias is negative. The average (i.e., m i0 − µ i ) across enrollees in each plan is 10.381, 1.754, and −8.943, respectively. to overcome the negative aggregate biases (μ pop < µ pop ) for both plan 1 and plan 2 enrollees.
The lower three plots in Figure 8 reveal the resolution of biases as consumers update beliefs with their pre-enrollment signal and their first consumption experience. The biases are resolved fastest in the full model because more uncertainty remains after the pre-enrollment signal in the full model ( σ 2 σ 2 pre /(σ 2 + σ 2 pre ) = 14.1) than in the others, which increases the weight on the post-enrollment and consumption signals despite their similar precisions across models.
Although biases conditional on enrollment plan dissipate quickly in the full model, consumers still require many signals to precisely learn their idiosyncratic µ i . After the post-installation signal, the standard deviation of the posterior is 3.9, or in dollar equivalents (by dividing by α = .358), $11. After the three experience signals this standard deviation is $7.40 and hits $4.90 after ten uses. The lack of switching, particularly by plan 3 enrollees who order frequently over long periods, contributes to the estimation of slow learning.
The full model's discount factor is .974. By comparison, Ackerberg (2003) estimates β = .981 between roughly weekly shopping trips. Figure 9 depicts the shift in usage due to information acquisition by forward-looking consumers. In the top graph, the week-1 usage probabilities for forward-looking consumers exceed the usage probabilities for myopic (though otherwise identical) consumers for all values of week 1 beliefs and subscribed plans. The lower graph plots the differences in these usage rates, which are substantial over a broad range of beliefs and reach .40.
The implied price sensitivity of consumers is also evident in Figure 9 : usage probabilities, holding beliefs fixed, are substantially higher for consumers on plan 1 than for consumers on the plans with per-use charges.
Given the lack of plan switching, our estimate of δ is high. Dividing the estimate of 74.468 utils by .358 dollars per util implies a switching cost equivalent to $208. Iyengar, Ansari, and Gupta (2007) estimate even higher "hassle costs" to switching wireless service plans and Handel (2010) estimates switching costs exceeding $2500. As reported in Figure 7 .b, we predict over half of plan 1 enrollees switch to plan 3 despite the high switching costs.
The last two columns of Table 2 
Counterfactual Simulations
We conduct two sets of counterfactuals. First we decompose the effects of switching costs and uncertainty on consumer behavior, consumer surplus, and the firm's revenues. Then we compute optimal menus of two-part tariffs to investigate the effectiveness of menus as screening devices for experience goods.
In each counterfactual, we simulate 50,000 consumers over 100 weeks-long enough for behavior and revenues to near their steady state. Discounted revenue and surplus values are reported in dollars per consumer assuming the firm's annual discount factor is .9. Table 3 summarizes consumer behavior and surplus and firm's discounted revenues, for various specifications of the model, when consumers face the actual tariff menu. The first two rows use the full model as estimated. In the long run (i.e., week 100), the firm receives $.96 per consumer, yielding a steady-state discounted revenue of $476.5 per consumer. The steady-state revenue is generally lower than the discounted revenue along the transition path since the firm earns revenues from consumers' experiential consumption.
Decomposing the effects of switching costs and uncertainty on outcomes
A consequence of consumers not knowing the population distribution of µ i is that their average realized consumer surplus (CS) will differ from their expected surplus. In the base case, consumers lost $39.2 on average when they expected surplus of $349. 14 Given (μ pop < µ pop ) one might expect realized CS to exceed expected CS. However, with uncertainty expected CS is driven primarily by the possibility that µ i is high, and the actual option value is lower than the perceived option value since σ pop is lower thanσ pop .
13 One might expect priors and match-values to depend on consumers' enrollment dates. We therefore allowed "week of enrollment" to linearly shift µpop,μpop, and their respective standard deviations in the random coefficient model (which accepts conditioning variables without adding dynamic programs to solve). The log-likelihood improves from −50502.5 to −50473.3, but the other estimates are virtually unchanged. Given that the random coefficients specification is primarily a robustness check for our finding that menus of tariffs fail to increase revenues, we do not report the estimates.
14 Choosing the outside good every week yields expected discounted utility of 22.6 (Euler's constant divided by
The second model in Table 3 removes switching costs by setting δ to zero. Both expected and realized CS increase, though realized CS is still negative as consumers invest too much in experiential consumption due to their over-estimation of the service's option value. Firms discounted revenues fall dramatically, from $497.2 per consumer with δ to $185.4 without δ as consumers who enroll on plans with fixed fees, given their conditional biases, switch to the fee-less plan 3 after learning their µ i is lower than expected.
The third model in Table 3 In summary, Table 3 consumers' behavior and surplus and the firm's revenues are driven largely by the combination of uncertainty and switching costs. The combination of biased beliefs (due to either aggregate or conditional biases) and high switching costs creates a windfall for firms and a costly learning experience for consumers. Table 3 also reports simulated outcomes for the models with no bias, only aggregate bias, and only conditional bias. The specification of initial beliefs, which determines product-level biases, has a significant impact on predicted revenues and consumer surplus.
Price discrimination
We evaluate the use of flat-rate tariffs, two-part tariffs, and menus of two-part tariffs to price discriminate when a firm sells an experience good. 15 With consumer uncertainty and switching costs, fixed fees play two roles: they extract surplus in the traditional (static) sense from inframarginal units, and they enable firms to capitalize on consumers' biases. Tariff offerings also determine the degree to which consumers learn. If the offered tariff(s) prevent some consumers from experimenting, the firm's long-run profits will suffer as some consumers who should use the product regularly will never discover this fact. On the other hand, the firm may earn substantial revenue from consumers who are willing to pay high prices during the learning period, given their initial beliefs.
We numerically compute optimal tariffs assuming the firm knows the match-value distribution and all demand parameters. Since we focus on consumer uncertainty and learning, we do not consider a need for the firm to discover the demand curve. We assume the firm maximizes expected 15 Firms frequently use two-part tariffs to extract surplus from individuals who consume multiple units of a given good. In our model, consumers either use the service once or not at all. Nonetheless, since the fee component of the two-part tariff is paid prior to the consumer's observing an idiosyncratic shock, surplus can still be extracted. In essence, the unit of consumption is the probability of using the service. When a firm faces consumers with (unobserved) heterogeneous preferences, offering a menu of two-part tariffs can induce them to reveal their preferences through their tariff choices.
discounted revenues, which is consistent with profit maximization when net marginal costs are zero as suggested by industry analysts. 16 Table 4 presents the optimal prices and fees for various tariffs when consumers behave according to the estimated full model. Given the high switching costs, the optimal flat-fee tariff of F = $5.32 generates over three times the discounted revenue of the optimal uniform price of p = $5.39. In this model all consumers have the same switching costs, so the optimal fixed fee is just low enough that no one quits (i.e., F = (1 − β)δ/α). The optimal single two-part tariff, with F = $1.98
and p = $4.09, yields 20 percent more revenue than the optimal fixed-rate tariff. Adding a second two-part tariff, however, fails to increase revenues.
We also compute optimal tariffs for the random coefficients model to assess whether richer consumer heterogeneity leads to revenue gains with tariff menus. The results appear in Table 5 .
Although the exact fees and prices differ from those derived from the full model, the broad implications are the same: a fixed fee, either by itself or as part of a two-part tariff, enables the firm to earn about four times more than with uniform pricing, and menus offer little to no gain over the optimal two-part tariff. The revenue gain from the second two-part tariff is less than .1 percent.
In our application menus of two-part tariffs are unable to segment consumers without letting high-usage consumers retain too much surplus: the incentive compatibility constraints are too costly to satisfy. Courty and Hao (2000) also find that segmenting consumers fails to increase profits when ex-ante consumer heterogeneity is high.
Conclusion
We show that conditional biases, which vary with consumers' signals, can explain consumers' tariff and usage choices for new products without invoking violations of rationality or explicit preferences for particular types of tariffs.
In particular, we demonstrate that conditional biases, as opposed to aggregate biases that affect all consumers equally, enables a Bayesian learning model to explain why consumers on fixed-rate plans often fail to use the product enough to justify the fixed fee. The finding by DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) that biased beliefs best explain consumers' contract choices for health clubs suggests our results may be relevant for other products as well.
Although we have focused on tariff choice, conditional bias is also relevant for standard (uniform) pricing of new products since consumers' adoption choices map into whether beliefs are 16 In addition to the revenue from the tariffs, the online grocer received a kickback from the partner chain of 15 percent of each grocery order. The average kickback was nearly $18 per order since the average order size was $119.
We do not observe the firm's costs of delivering groceries. An industry analyst who estimates "picking and delivery costs" for a number of online grocers estimates our firm's costs were $25.41 per delivery. (Reported by D. Wellman in "Are we on?" Supermarket Business, New York: Dec 15, 1999, 54:12, p. 35.) Marginal costs are presumably lower than this average cost since the delivery truck is already delivering orders to other customers. For simplicity, we treat the kickback amount as exactly offsetting the marginal costs of delivery and instead maximize discounted revenues from delivery tariffs.
above some threshold. In particular, conditional bias increases the probability of disappointment among consumers who purchase new products. .5 We fix β in the random coefficients model to avoid convergence delays when a random β draw is close to 1. We started the random coefficients estimation from two local maxima of the full model. The run based on the local maximum with β = .981 yielded the highest likelihood. In the random coefficients model the standard deviation of µ pop serves the role of σ pop . All models use an exogenous weekly quit rate of γ = .003. µ pop is not identified in the conditional-bias-only model since it receives no weight in the posterior. Estimated switching costs when β = 0 deter all switching, so we fix δ = ∞. Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Rev f inal 1−β f irm measures the firm's steady-state discounted revenue per consumer. All values generated by simulating 50,000 consumers over 100 weeks with γ = 0. All values generated by simulating 50,000 consumers over 100 weeks with γ = 0. For ease of comparison, single tariff "menus" also appear as "plan 2" or "plan 3." Menus of two-part tariffs offered no advantage over the single two-part tariff. In each simulation consumers can also choose to not enroll in any plan. Values generated by simulating 5000 consumers over 100 weeks with γ = 0 for 100 draws of θ. For ease of comparison, single tariff "menus" also appear as "plan 2" or "plan 3." An additional ex-post only tariff offered no advantage over 2 two-part tariffs. In each simulation consumers can also choose to not enroll in any plan. 
